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Undergraduate Studies:

B.A., Mathematics (*honors*) and Mathematical Economics (*high honors*), Colgate University, 2015.

Graduate Studies:

Harvard University, 2017 to present
Ph.D. Candidate in Business Economics
Expected Completion Date: May 2023

References:

Professor Emily Breza
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Professor Edward Glaeser
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Professor Myrto Kalouptsi
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Professor Ariel Pakes
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Professor Gautam Rao
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Teaching and Research Fields:

Industrial Organization, Development Economics

Teaching Experience:

Fall 2019	Intermediate Microeconomics: Advanced, Harvard University, teaching fellow for Professor Edward Glaeser
Spring 2019	Economic Development and the International Economic System, Harvard Kennedy School, teaching fellow for Professor Arvind Subramanian

Employment:

2015 - 2017 NERA Economic Consulting, Washington D.C., *Analyst*

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:

2021	Structural Transformation and Economic Growth (STEG) Grant (with Shresth Garg)
2021	Warburg Fund Grant
2020	Lab for Economic Applications and Policy (LEAP) Grant (with Shresth Garg)
2020	Harvard Global Institute (HGI) Grant (with Shresth Garg)
2019	Certificate of Distinction in Teaching, Harvard University
2018	Amartya Sen Fellowship for Students from India
2015	Phi Beta Kappa
2015	Chi-Ming Hou Award for Excellence in International Economics, Colgate University

Research Papers:

“Redistribution Through Prices in Indian Agricultural Markets” *Job Market Paper*
(with Shresth Garg)

Abstract: How do government programs that distort prices in agricultural markets affect producers and consumers along the income distribution? We study the distributional effects of three such programs in Indian agricultural markets: fertilizer subsidies, procurement of crops at minimum support prices (MSP), and sale of subsidized grains to households. These interventions directly impact hundreds of millions of people and cost about 1.2% of India's GDP. To examine their effects, we estimate a structural model of supply and demand with heterogeneous risk-averse producers, who choose a portfolio of crops and crop-specific inputs, and heterogeneous households who make consumption decisions. Using the estimated structural parameters, we solve for counterfactual equilibria in which these interventions are phased out. On the demand-side, we find these programs to be progressive. In their absence, consumption and expenditures of lower-income households would be affected more adversely. On the supply-side, we find these programs to be (weakly) regressive. Higher fertilizer prices, in the absence of subsidies, would be compensated by higher output prices so impact on farmer welfare would be minimal. Under no government-procurement at MSP, richer farmers would experience a greater welfare loss, while some of the poorest farmers would gain -- a result driven partly by the inequitable implementation of the procurement program.

“Subsidies Trump Tariffs: Case of Utility-Scale Solar in India” (with Shresth Garg)

Abstract: Policymakers often intervene in markets to protect domestic producers against foreign competitors. Two such interventions are import tariffs and production subsidies, both of which are, in general, costly. In this paper, we study the relative magnitudes of these costs in the context of the Indian utility-scale solar sector. The Indian government, in recent years, has relied on both import tariffs and production subsidies to support the domestic solar module manufacturing industry. Using a structural model of the solar module industry and its downstream counterpart — the solar power plant industry, we quantify the short-run costs of expanding the size and share of domestic solar module manufacturing using tariffs and subsidies. We find small net costs associated with production subsidies and much larger costs associated with import tariffs. Specifically, in our main counterfactual, we find that expanding domestic output using just import tariffs reduces welfare associated with this industry by 46% relative to baseline, while doing so using just production subsidies reduces welfare by less than 1%.